CVE-2026-102277: brace-expansion: Quadratic-time expansion of the `{a},b}` rewrite causes CPU denial of service
Summary Expanding {a},b}-shaped input takes time quadratic in the number of literal } characters, blocking the event loop. Bash preserves a quirk where a brace group followed by a comma set still expands ({a},b}). The parser implements this by rewriting the string and restarting the scan. Each pass absorbs exactly one } and re-scans from the beginning, so n trailing braces cost n full passes.
Published Sep 29, 2026
Affected packages
brace-expansion
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 4.0.0, < 5.0.12
- Fixed in
- 5.0.12
- Check
npm ls brace-expansion
brace-expansion
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 3.0.0, < 3.0.9
- Fixed in
- 3.0.9
- Check
npm ls brace-expansion
brace-expansion
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 2.0.0, < 2.1.7
- Fixed in
- 2.1.7
- Check
npm ls brace-expansion
brace-expansion
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 1.1.21
- Fixed in
- 1.1.21
- Check
npm ls brace-expansion
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Expanding {a},b}-shaped input takes time quadratic in the number of literal } characters, blocking the event loop.
Bash preserves a quirk where a brace group followed by a comma set still expands ({a},b}). The parser implements this by rewriting the string and restarting the scan. Each pass absorbs exactly one } and re-scans from the beginning, so n trailing braces cost n full passes.
Reproduction
const build = n => '{a}' + '}'.repeat(n) + ',z}'
for (const n of [8000, 16000, 32000, 64000, 128000]) {
const t = Date.now()
expand(build(n))
console.log(n, Date.now() - t + 'ms')
}| n | input | time | results | | 8,000 | 8 KB | 110 ms | 2 | | 16,000 | 16 KB | 446 ms | 2 | | 32,000 | 32 KB | 1.7 s | 2 | | 64,000 | 64 KB | 6.9 s | 2 | | 128,000 | 128 KB | **27.7 s** | 2 |
ms/n^2 is flat at ~1.7 and each doubling of n costs exactly 4.0x - quadratic. 128 KB of input blocks the event loop for nearly half a minute to produce two results.
Mechanism
Instrumenting the rewrite branch confirms it runs exactly n + 1 times, once per literal }, each re-scanning the whole string.
There is a second multiplier. The rewrite replaces the group's closing } with the internal escClose sentinel, which is '\0CLOSE' + Math.random() + '\0' - about 25 characters. The working string therefore *grows* by ~25 characters on every pass:
| n | input length | final string length | | 1,000 | 1,006 | 26,006 | | 8,000 | 8,006 | 208,006 |
So the input is inflated roughly 26x, and that factor multiplies both the quadratic constant and peak memory. This makes it partly a memory-pressure issue as well as a CPU one.
Why max and maxLength do not help
The cost is in parsing, before the result set exists. The payload yields 2 results regardless of size, so neither bound is ever reached.
Impact
An application passing an untrusted pattern to expand(), directly or through minimatch / glob, can have its event loop blocked for tens of seconds by a payload well under minimatch's 65,536-character cap. For a single-threaded Node server that is a full stall, not just a slow request.
Degraded availability rather than a crash - the process recovers once the expansion completes.
Affected versions
Verified affected on 1.1.18, 2.1.4, 3.0.6 and 5.0.9, all within a few percent of each other (~460-490 ms at n=16,000).
Patch
The rewrite loop gets an iteration bound. Past the cap the remaining string is treated as non-expanding and returned literally, consistent with the existing max / maxLength caps, which truncate rather than throw.
Note this bounds the number of passes, not the cost of each: worst-case work remains proportional to cap x input length. The cap is set low enough that the residual is bounded in practice, and far above what any realistic {a},b} input needs.
Severity note
Scored 5.3 Medium (A:L) for consistency with GHSA-3jxr-9vmj-r5cp, the other algorithmic-complexity advisory on this package (CWE-407), which uses the same vector. The stack-exhaustion advisories on this package score A:H because they crash the process outright; this one stalls it.
Credited to G-Rath, katzj.
References
- https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/security/advisories/GHSA-q2hr-2g5m-vwhr
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102277
- https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/33a5ef17b8d800bbfa8c52b14c39043b6aac1a96
- https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/bdff773f98e5988616b7039cc9b508df5d640b22
- https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/c55e67d8d8b1c56a2474afff15c2891166b2d364
- https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/ffdfa3e3806bed17c0874b8f1439b084de354a7e
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q2hr-2g5m-vwhr
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More npm vulnerabilities
All npm entriesCVE-2026-102276
brace-expansion: DoS via uncontrolled recursion in parseCommaParts causing stack exhaustion
high7.5Sep 29, 2026CVE-2026-102278
brace-expansion: DoS via uncontrolled recursion on nested brace groups causing stack exhaustion
high7.5Sep 29, 2026CVE-2026-69152
brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded intermediate arrays, bypassing the CVE-2026-14257 mitigation
high7.5Aug 3, 2026CVE-2026-14257
brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded expansion length causing an out-of-memory process crash
high7.5Jul 24, 2026CVE-2026-13149
brace-expansion: DoS via exponential-time expansion of consecutive non-expanding {} groups
high5.3Jul 20, 2026CVE-2026-45149
brace-expansion: Large numeric range defeats documented `max` DoS protection
medium6.5May 18, 2026
