CVE-2025-69263: pnpm Has Lockfile Integrity Bypass that Allows Remote Dynamic Dependencies
Summary HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) are stored in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed.
Published Jan 7, 2026 · Updated Jan 8, 2026
Affected packages
pnpm
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 10.26.0
- Fixed in
- 10.26.0
- Check
npm ls pnpm
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) are stored in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed.
Details
When a package depends on an HTTP tarball URL, pnpm's tarball resolver returns only the URL without computing an integrity hash:
resolving/tarball-resolver/src/index.ts:
return {
resolution: {
tarball: resolvedUrl,
// No integrity field
},
resolvedVia: 'url',
}The resulting lockfile entry has no integrity to verify:
remote-dynamic-dependency@http://example.com/pkg.tgz:
resolution: {tarball: http://example.com/pkg.tgz}
version: 1.0.0Since there is no integrity hash, pnpm cannot detect when the server returns different content.
This affects:
- HTTP/HTTPS tarball URLs (
"pkg": "https://example.com/pkg.tgz") - Git shorthand dependencies (
"pkg": "github:user/repo") - Git URLs (
"pkg": "git+https://github.com/user/repo")
npm registry packages are not affected as they include integrity hashes from the registry metadata.
PoC
See attached pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip
The POC includes:
- A server that returns different tarball content on each request
- A
malicious-packagethat depends on the HTTP tarball - A
victimproject that depends onmalicious-package
To run:
cd pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc
./run-poc.shThe output shows that each install (with pnpm store prune between them) downloads different code despite having a committed lockfile.
Impact
An attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. This enables:
- Targeted attacks based on request metadata (IP, headers, timing)
- Evasion of security audits (serve benign code during review, malicious code later)
- Supply chain attacks where the malicious payload changes over time
The attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection.
Credited to orenyomtov.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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