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Open-source package vulnerability · RubyGems

CVE-2025-61771: Rack: Multipart parser buffers large non‑file fields entirely in memory, enabling DoS (memory exhaustion)

highCVSS 3.1 7.5GHSA-w9pc-fmgc-vxvw

Summary Rack::Multipart::Parser stores non-file form fields (parts without a filename) entirely in memory as Ruby String objects. A single large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS).

Published Oct 7, 2025 · Updated Oct 13, 2025

Affected packages

rack

Ecosystem
RubyGems
Affected
< 2.2.19
Fixed in
2.2.19
Check
bundle info rack

rack

Ecosystem
RubyGems
Affected
>= 3.1, < 3.1.17
Fixed in
3.1.17
Check
bundle info rack

rack

Ecosystem
RubyGems
Affected
>= 3.2, < 3.2.2
Fixed in
3.2.2
Check
bundle info rack

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

Rack::Multipart::Parser stores non-file form fields (parts without a filename) entirely in memory as Ruby String objects. A single large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS).

Details

During multipart parsing, file parts are streamed to temporary files, but non-file parts are buffered into memory:

body = String.new  # non-file → in-RAM buffer
@mime_parts[mime_index].body << content

There is no size limit on these in-memory buffers. As a result, any large text field—while technically valid—will be loaded fully into process memory before being added to params.

Impact

Attackers can send large non-file fields to trigger excessive memory usage. Impact scales with request size and concurrency, potentially leading to worker crashes or severe garbage-collection overhead. All Rack applications processing multipart form submissions are affected.

Mitigation

  • Upgrade: Use a patched version of Rack that enforces a reasonable size cap for non-file fields (e.g., 2 MiB).
  • Workarounds:
  • Restrict maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx client_max_body_size).
  • Validate and reject unusually large form fields at the application level.

Credited to kwkr, jeremyevans, ioquatix.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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