CVE-2025-61771: Rack: Multipart parser buffers large non‑file fields entirely in memory, enabling DoS (memory exhaustion)
Summary Rack::Multipart::Parser stores non-file form fields (parts without a filename) entirely in memory as Ruby String objects. A single large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS).
Published Oct 7, 2025 · Updated Oct 13, 2025
Affected packages
rack
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- < 2.2.19
- Fixed in
- 2.2.19
- Check
bundle info rack
rack
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- >= 3.1, < 3.1.17
- Fixed in
- 3.1.17
- Check
bundle info rack
rack
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- >= 3.2, < 3.2.2
- Fixed in
- 3.2.2
- Check
bundle info rack
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Rack::Multipart::Parser stores non-file form fields (parts without a filename) entirely in memory as Ruby String objects. A single large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS).
Details
During multipart parsing, file parts are streamed to temporary files, but non-file parts are buffered into memory:
body = String.new # non-file → in-RAM buffer
@mime_parts[mime_index].body << contentThere is no size limit on these in-memory buffers. As a result, any large text field—while technically valid—will be loaded fully into process memory before being added to params.
Impact
Attackers can send large non-file fields to trigger excessive memory usage. Impact scales with request size and concurrency, potentially leading to worker crashes or severe garbage-collection overhead. All Rack applications processing multipart form submissions are affected.
Mitigation
- Upgrade: Use a patched version of Rack that enforces a reasonable size cap for non-file fields (e.g., 2 MiB).
- Workarounds:
- Restrict maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx
client_max_body_size). - Validate and reject unusually large form fields at the application level.
Credited to kwkr, jeremyevans, ioquatix.
References
- https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-w9pc-fmgc-vxvw
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61771
- https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/589127f4ac8b5cf11cf88fb0cd116ffed4d2181e
- https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/d869fed663b113b95a74ad53e1b5cae6ab31f29e
- https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/e08f78c656c9394d6737c022bde087e0f33336fd
- https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/rack/CVE-2025-61771.yml
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w9pc-fmgc-vxvw
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More RubyGems vulnerabilities
All RubyGems entriesCVE-2026-125108
Rack: Multipart boundary ambiguity guard in Rack::Multipart::Parser can be bypassed with a quoted boundary value, allowing WAF bypass
low3.7Nov 10, 2026CVE-2026-125109
Rack: Rack::Request#host_with_port (and #base_url / #url) return the raw invalid Host header — incomplete fix of CVE-2026-34835
medium4.8Nov 10, 2026CVE-2026-125110
Rack: Rack::Static header_rules bypass via dot-segment normalization mismatch
medium5.3Nov 10, 2026CVE-2026-125111
Rack: Multipart parsing allows DoS via unbounded scan buffer growth
high7.5Nov 10, 2026CVE-2026-26961
Rack's greedy multipart boundary parsing can cause parser differentials and WAF bypass.
medium5.3Apr 2, 2026CVE-2026-26962
Rack's improper unfolding of folded multipart headers preserves CRLF in parsed parameter values
medium4.8Apr 2, 2026
