CVE-2025-27773: The SimpleSAMLphp SAML2 library incorrectly verifies signatures for HTTP-Redirect binding
Summary There's a signature confusion attack in the HTTPRedirect binding. An attacker with any signed SAMLResponse via the HTTP-Redirect binding can cause the application to accept an unsigned message. I believe that it exists for v4 only. I have not yet developed a PoC. V5 is well designed and instead builds the signed query from the same message that will be consumed.
Published Mar 11, 2025 · Updated May 9, 2025
Affected packages
simplesamlphp/saml2
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- >= 5.0.0-alpha.1, <= 5.0.0-alpha.19
- Fixed in
- 5.0.0-alpha.20
- Check
composer show simplesamlphp/saml2
simplesamlphp/saml2
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 4.16.15
- Fixed in
- 4.17.0
- Check
composer show simplesamlphp/saml2
simplesamlphp/saml2-legacy
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 4.16.15
- Fixed in
- 4.17.0
- Check
composer show simplesamlphp/saml2-legacy
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
There's a signature confusion attack in the HTTPRedirect binding. An attacker with any signed SAMLResponse via the HTTP-Redirect binding can cause the application to accept an unsigned message.
I believe that it exists for v4 only. I have not yet developed a PoC.
V5 is well designed and instead builds the signed query from the same message that will be consumed.
Details
What is verified
The data['SignedQuery'] is the string that will be verified by the public key.
It is defined here: https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/blob/9545abd0d9d48388f2fa00469c5c1e0294f0303e/src/SAML2/HTTPRedirect.php#L178-L217
THe code will iterate through each parameter name. Notably, sigQuery is overridden each time when processing, making the last of SAMLRequest/SAMLResponse used for sigQuery.
For example, given:
SAMLRequest=a&SAMLResponse=idpsigned
SAMLResponse=idpsigned will be set as sigQuery, then later verified
What is actually processed
Processing uses SAMLRequest parameter value first, (if it exists) then SAMLResponse:
https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/blob/9545abd0d9d48388f2fa00469c5c1e0294f0303e/src/SAML2/HTTPRedirect.php#L104-L113
Given this, the contents that are processed might not be the same as the data that is actually verified.
Exploiting
Suppose an attacker has a signed HTTP Redirect binding from IdP, say a signed logout response. :
SAMLResponse=idpsigned&RelayState=...&SigAlg=...&Signature
Then an attacker can append SAMLRequest in front:
SAMLRequest=unverifieddata&SAMLResponse=idpsigned&RelayState=...&SigAlg=...&Signature=..
SimpleSAMLPhp will only verify the SAMLResponse, but will actually use the SAMLRequest contents. The impact here is increased because there's no checks that SAMLRequest actually contains a Request, it could instead contain an Response, which allows the attacker to effectively impersonate any user within the SP.
IdPs
Microsoft Azure AD/Entra (and likely ADFS) signs the LogoutResponse via this SimpleSign format in HTTP Redirect binding. If an attacker logs out of Entra, they will be able to extract a valid Signature.
Attached is an HTTP Request when an I initiated a SLO request from the service provider to the IdP (entra). Then IdP POSTed this SAMLResponse with HTTP Redirect binding signature, via the user browser to the SP. It should be possible to carry out the described attack with this.
https://webhook.site/c6038292-6ef5-46ac-973d-d7c25520ec48/logout?SAMLResponse=fVJNa%2bMwEP0rRndZtmw5tnAMy%2fYSaC9N6aGXIsmjVMTRGI9M%2bvObdeihsPQ4w7x5HzM9mcs060c84ZqegWaMBNnhYc%2fejS1UW1TAnVU7XldK8s7JkcvOd60Db3zTsewVFgoY90zmBcsORCscIiUT061VyJqXJS%2fbl7LRUmrZ5mXdvLHsASiFaNKG%2fEhpJi3EFewH4jmnkEC4pqha2UnegFe8bozj3a4a%2bbhzUilZgKtbMW2yb7TxW%2foL7lkM9hTC2XnEOPvZXjDECb2N1lh7mvBsp%2bnsErDs8zJF0lsEe7YuUaOhQDqaC5BOTh%2f%2fPD3qmzE9L5jQ4cSGfrO43KG%2fgwwRLP8ssuHbIiXKryGOeKU8QhLSVN7WteejV8Bru%2bt4WynFbwE3bdVV5ahG0Ys759Dfj3VMJq30s%2fqLI2SvZlrhd020Tevj6hwQMTH04udS8b%2bHGL4A&Signature=Z%2f7gIPv7Gkgvqtwo0bzgXyum9IjHMfP0zTYuNbl%2fBUGlQ%2fU%2bbOZGZJ6Rk9wLUyvNQ5XlZRxZrfESNA%2bn0CVyIedsg9GxQKTi7VqPTJFJqEIP1BZaEpYYP3%2f6sFfLxfTMKecJoQdxnDE5Malte1hMj2UujWnLXOnp0CgO%2f%2fU2K52SoGckIzNDRB%2fJ6%2fysTn%2bDjBrmgdro%2fgdTyby9%2f3vm8dzY8pUkRCgMjlimShrZxr5U33wQvwPLIXlDgActr91RUtWKE0k8sy%2brshrK9DKLPo8AdTLk7NYhjSWdF7OG7uqgEeEo470tacqQuA09E0qDh8CWS%2bycLJijiGYWVyQa4Q%3d%3d&SigAlg=http%3a%2f%2fwww.w3.org%2f2001%2f04%2fxmldsig-more%23rsa-sha256Credited to ahacker1-securesaml, ZeiP.
References
- https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/security/advisories/GHSA-46r4-f8gj-xg56
- https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/commit/7867d6099dc7f31bed1ea10e5bea159c5623d2a0
- https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/blob/9545abd0d9d48388f2fa00469c5c1e0294f0303e/src/SAML2/HTTPRedirect.php#L104-L113
- https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/blob/9545abd0d9d48388f2fa00469c5c1e0294f0303e/src/SAML2/HTTPRedirect.php#L178-L217
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27773
- https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/05/msg00013.html
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-46r4-f8gj-xg56
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Composer (PHP) vulnerabilities
All Composer (PHP) entriesCVE-2026-110782
SAML2: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-49283: unsigned embedded Response bypasses HTTP-Artifact signature verification (no embedded-Issuer binding)
high8.7Nov 17, 2026CVE-2026-49283
SimpleSAMLphp HTTP-Artifact TLS validator confusion allows cross-IdP authentication bypass
high8.7Jul 2, 2026CVE-2026-49289
SimpleSAMLphp has Possible DoS via XPath Transform
high7.5Jul 2, 2026CVE-2024-52806
SimpleSAMLphp SAML2 has an XXE in parsing SAML messages
medium8.3Dec 2, 2024
