CVE-2023-51664: tj-actions/changed-files has Potential Actions command injection in output filenames (GHSL-2023-271)
Summary The tj-actions/changed-files workflow allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets. Details The changed-files action returns a list of files changed in a commit or pull request which provides an escapejson input enabled by default, only escapes " for JSON values.
Published Jan 2, 2024 · Updated Jan 4, 2024
Affected packages
tj-actions/changed-files
- Ecosystem
- GitHub Actions
- Affected
- < 41
- Fixed in
- 41
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The tj-actions/changed-files workflow allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.
Details
The `changed-files` action returns a list of files changed in a commit or pull request which provides an escape_json input enabled by default, only escapes " for JSON values.
This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as ; and \ (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the [GitHub Runner](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-github-hosted-runners/about-github-hosted-runners) if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a run block. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal **secrets** such as GITHUB_TOKEN if triggered on other events than pull_request. For example on push`.
Proof of Concept
- Submit a pull request to a repository with a new file injecting a command. For example
$(whoami).txtwhich is a valid filename. - Upon approval of the workflow (triggered by the pull request), the action will get executed and the malicious pull request filename will flow into the
List all changed filesstep below.
- name: List all changed files
run: |
for file in ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}; do
echo "$file was changed"
doneExample output:
##[group]Run for file in $(whoami).txt; do
for file in $(whoami).txt; do
echo "$file was changed"
done
shell: /usr/bin/bash -e {0}
##[endgroup]
runner.txt was changedImpact
This issue may lead to arbitrary command execution in the GitHub Runner.
Resolution
- A new
safe_outputinput would be enabled by default and return filename paths escaping special characters like ;, ` (backtick), $, (), etc for bash environments.
- A safe recommendation of using environment variables to store unsafe outputs.
- name: List all changed files
env:
ALL_CHANGED_FILES: ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}
run: |
for file in "$ALL_CHANGED_FILES"; do
echo "$file was changed"
doneResources
Credited to jorgectf, jsoref.
References
- https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/security/advisories/GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-51664
- https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/commit/0102c07446a3cad972f4afcbd0ee4dbc4b6d2d1b
- https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/commit/716b1e13042866565e00e85fd4ec490e186c4a2f
- https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/commit/ff2f6e6b91913a7be42be1b5917330fe442f2ede
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
